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The Tribal Right to Exclude Non-Tribal Members from Indian-
Owned Lands. 
Alex Tallchief Skibine* 
Last May, two Indian tribes in South Dakota, the Cheyenne River Sioux and Oglala 
Sioux Tribes, invoking the dangers caused by Covid-19, established health safety checkpoints on 
state and federal roads accessing the entrance to their reservations. The South Dakota governor 
immediately threatened legal action, arguing that such roadblocks could only happen pursuant to 
an agreement with the State.1  Later that summer, the Blackfeet Nation in northern Montana 
refused to open its access road to tourists wanting to visit Glacier National Park.2  Unlike in 
South Dakota, the Montana Governor supported the Tribe’s decision. In South Dakota, the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe argued that the Tribal checkpoints were legal because the tribe had 
a “treaty right to exclude” non-members from its reservation.3  Besides the treaty right to 
exclude, the tribes can also claim that as sovereign nations they have the inherent power to 
control their borders. This article does not focus on the Covid-19 issues facing the tribes.  Others 
have already done this.4  Instead, it casts a wider net and examines from a general perspective the 
Tribes’ power to exclude non-members from their reservations.   
When it comes to inherent tribal powers to control people who are not members of the 
tribe, hereinafter referred to as non-members, the Supreme Court in a 1981 case,  Montana v. 
United States,5 announced a somewhat new principle that unless one of two exceptions applied, 
as a general rule Indian tribes have been implicitly divested of the  inherent sovereign power to 
control the activities of non-members on lands owned by non-members within the reservation.  
This doctrine would become known as the implicit divestiture doctrine.6  Besides its inherent 
sovereign power, the Crow Tribe in Montana had also invoked its treaty right to exclude non-
 
• S.J Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.  J.D. 
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.   
1 That lawsuit was never filed. Instead, the Governor asked for the help of the Federal government which 
eventually threatened to cancel a number of contracts it had with the two tribes unless they complied with 
the request to dismantle their roadblocks.   One of these tribe eventually filed a lawsuit asking for 
injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the federal government to make good on its threat.  The facts 
as stated here are taken from the tribal complaint which was filed on June 23, 2020, case 1:20-cv-01709. 
The complaint is available on the June 24th Turtle Blog.  
2 See Washington Post article “A closed border, pandemic-weary tourists and a big bottleneck at Glacier 
National Park, available in the Turtle Blog and June 13, 2020. 
3 The letter was issued on May 8th 2020.  It is available on the May 11th Turtle Blog.  
4 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Lives Matter: Pandemic and Inherent Tribal Powers, 73 Stanford 
Law Review On Line, June 2020. 
5 450 U.S. 544 (1981).  
6 See discussion at notes 17-25. 
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members from the reservation, arguing that this right includes the lesser right to regulate those 
who are allowed to stay on the land. The Court held, however, that when Congress opened a 
reservation for land to be acquired by non-members, it implies a congressional intent to abrogate 
the treaty right to exclude on such acquired lands.7  In addition, because neither of the two 
exceptions to Montana’s general rule were available, the Crow tribe could not control fishing 
activities by non-members on the Big Horn River within its reservation since the bed of the river 
was now owned by the State.  
For twenty years, the Montana general rule was not applied to limit tribal jurisdiction 
over non-member activities taking place on tribal or Indian owned land.8 However, in 2001, the 
Supreme Court unanimously extended the Montana principle to Indian owned land in Nevada v. 
Hicks.9  It has now been almost twenty years since Hicks was decided and an analysis of the 
cases show that lower courts have disagreed on when to apply Montana to assertion of tribal 
jurisdiction over non-members on Indian owned lands.  One of the main reason for this lack of 
consistency is that although unanimous in its holding that the tribal court did not have 
jurisdiction over a lawsuit involving state law enforcement officials as defendants, the Hicks 
Court was badly divided on the reasoning for the holding. In effect, even though Justice Scalia 
wrote the majority opinion for the Court, there were two other opinions, consisting of three 
Justices each,10 each adopting a different view of what role the status of the land played in 
determining whether the tribe had jurisdiction.11    
Many noted scholars have addressed the issue of tribal jurisdiction over non-members 
comprehensively.12  Notably, Professor Judith Royster in a perceptive 2015 article covered some 
 
7 Id., at 558-559, stating “If the 1868 treaty created tribal power to restrict or prohibit non-Indian hunting 
and fishing on the reservation, that power cannot apply to lands held in fee by non-Indians… this tribal 
“authority could only extend to land on which the Tribe exercises “absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation.” 
8 See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 
(1997); Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 
(1980); 
9 533 U.S. 353 (2001),  
10 In addition to the Scalia opinion, Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Kennedy 
and Thomas.  Justice O’Connor filed an opinion concurring in part joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens.   
11 There was also a concurring opinion by Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself, and a concurring opinion 
by Justice Stevens joined by Justice Breyer that did not add much of anything new to Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion which these two Justices also had joined.    
12 See e.g. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 779 
(2014) Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness, Reimagining Tribal Courts' Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1499 (2013), Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide for 
Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187 (2010). 
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of the same grounds this article will be addressing.13  Like her, I also take the position that 
Montana should not apply to lands in which tribes have retained the right to exclude.14  
However, in concluding that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Hicks is neither intelligible nor 
doctrinally helpful,”15 Professor Royster did not try to make sense of Justice Scalia’s heavy 
reliance on the State’s interests in law enforcement.  In this Article, I make two arguments.  The 
first one is that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks can be conceptualized as using the state interest 
in law enforcement to support the finding that  the tribe had lost the right to exclude state law 
enforcement officials in the case.  In effect, Hicks could be read as requiring a two-step analysis 
to determine if an Indian tribe has retained jurisdiction over non-members on Indian owned 
lands.  First, courts should determine whether a tribe has retained its right to exclude. If the 
answer is yes, this is the end of the inquiry and the tribe has jurisdiction.  If the answer is no, step 
two requires courts to apply the Montana framework in determining whether one or both of the 
exceptions to Montana’s general rule apply to preserve tribal jurisdiction.  The second argument 
is that Hicks should have really been decided as a state jurisdiction case.  The results would have 
been the same as a finding of state jurisdiction in this case should have preempted tribal court 
jurisdiction.  However, in the long run, relying on state jurisdiction as preempting tribal 
jurisdiction would have been potentially less harmful to tribal sovereignty and would not have 
generated the same degree of confusion and difference of opinions among the circuits.     
In addition, this article analyzes whether there should be a difference between a  tribal 
treaty right to exclude non-members from the reservations and the “inherent sovereign” right to 
exclude when it comes to decide whether such a “right to exclude” has been abrogated.  
Professor Royster took the position that there should not be any difference, stating “Not all 
Indian tribes have treaties with the federal government. When it comes to tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers on Indian lands based on treaty rights, where does that leave tribes without formal 
treaties? The answer, I submit, is in exactly the same place as tribes with treaties.”16 In this 
Article, I take the position that this may not necessarily be the case. 
To explore these issues, Part I will explain the Court’s jurisprudence when it comes to tribal 
control over non-members.  Part II will analyze the on-going debate among the Federal Circuit 
 
13 See Judith V. Royster, Revisiting Montana: Indian Treaty Rights and Tribal Authority over 
Nonmembers on Trust Lands, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 889 (2015). 
14 Id., stating “Over the years, discussions of the Montana-Hicks line of cases seem to start and end with 
the question of inherent tribal authority over nonmembers… The treaty rights approach has been lost in 
the discussion and needs to be revived. This Article intends to bring the treaty rights argument--that 
Indian tribes have rights to govern on trust lands recognized by treaty and treaty-equivalents--back to the 
forefront. Id., at 892.   
15  If., at 904.  
16 Royster, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 889, 919. 
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Court of Appeals concerning the interpretation of Hicks and concludes by arguing that Hicks 
should be re-imagined as a state jurisdiction case.  Finally, after exploring the differences, if any, 
between the tribes’ sovereign right to exclude and their treaty right to exclude, PART III looks at 
the right to exclude beyond tribal jurisdiction over non-members, namely the role the right to 
exclude plays when it comes to determining whether federal laws of general applicability should 
apply to Indian tribes.   
Part I: The implicit divestiture doctrine and the right to exclude from Montana to Hicks 
and beyond. 
1. Montana v. United States: The “path-marking” case.17  
The main issue in Montana was whether the tribe had the authority to regulate hunting and 
fishing by non-members on land determined by the Court to be non-Indian fee land located 
within the Crow Indian reservation.  The tribe first argued that its 1868 treaty with the United 
States granted such tribal authority because  Article II of the treaty not only established a 
reservation for the Crow Tribe, but also provided that it be “set apart for the absolute and 
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein named.”18  The Court disagreed with this 
argument. While recognizing that “the treaty obligated the United States to prohibit most non-
Indians from residing on or passing through reservation lands used and occupied by the Tribe, 
and, thereby, arguably conferred upon the Tribe the authority to control fishing and hunting on 
those lands,”19 the Court held that this authority “could only extend to land on which the Tribe 
exercises “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.”20 Since the land in question was now 
owned by the State, the Tribe could no longer exercise undisturbed use and occupation.   
Having disposed of the treaty argument, the Court addressed whether the Tribe could 
nevertheless control non-members under its inherent sovereign power.  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Stewart announced what, at the time, seemed to have been a new principle that the 
“exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.”21  After stating this 
principle, Justice Stewart held that as a “general proposition,” the inherent powers of an Indian 
tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”22  
 
17 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Montana was first referred as “path-marking” in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 
U.S. 438, 445 (1997).  
18 15 Stat. 649 
19 Id., at 558 
20 Id., at 559 
21 Id., at 564 
22 Id., at 565. 
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The Court, however, identified two exceptions to its general rule. The first exception, now 
known as the consensual relations exception, allows tribes “to regulate through taxation, 
licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter into consensual relationships 
with the tribe or its members through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or 
other arrangements.”23 The second exception, known as the tribal self-government exception, 
allows tribal civil authority over the conduct of non-members (even on fee lands within the 
reservation) “when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.”24  Unfortunately for the Crow Tribe, 
however, neither of the exceptions applied to this case.25 
2. Strate v. A-1- Contractors: Equating tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction with tribal 
regulatory power.  
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,26 the issue was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction over a 
lawsuit filed by one non-member against another non-member over a routine fender bender 
accident that happened within the reservation but on a road over which the state had obtained a 
right of way. In holding that the tribal court had no jurisdiction, the opinion brought three 
important clarifications, or perhaps modifications, to the Montana analysis. First it clarified that 
in order to be considered “Indian owned“ land for the purposes of the Montana analysis, the 
Tribe had to have retained a “gatekeeper” role in excluding non-members from the area.27 
Secondly, and more importantly, it held that the Montana analysis was applicable to both tribal 
regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction because “as to nonmembers, a tribe's adjudicative 
jurisdiction cannot  exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”28 This meant that in order to determine 
whether a tribal court had jurisdiction over a non-member defendant, courts only have to ask 
whether the tribal council could have regulated the non-member activity on the land in question.  
Third, the Court considerably narrowed the scope of the tribal self-government exception to 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
25 Id., at 566, stating, “No such circumstances, however, are involved in this case. Non-Indian hunters and 
fishermen on non-Indian fee land do not enter any agreements or dealings with the Crow Tribe so as to 
subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And nothing in this case suggests that such non-Indian 
hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe's political or economic security as to justify tribal regulation.” 
26 520 U.S. 438 (1997).  
27 Id., at 456.  Since the tribe had not maintained that role here, the Court ruled that the state right of way 
was the equivalent of non-member fee land for the purposes of the Montana analysis.  
28 520 U.S. at 453. 
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Montana’s general rule by holding that having jurisdiction over non-members driving on state 
roads within reservations was not necessary to the health and welfare of the tribes.29       
Unlike in Strate, where the location of the accident was clear and undisputed, determining 
where, for the purposes of the Montana analysis, the crucial facts took place can be a 
complicated question.30  For instance, in Wilson v. Horton’s Towing,31 a tribal police officer 
suspected that Wilson, a non-Indian, was driving while inebriated.  The officer stopped Wilson 
on a state road within the reservation.  After finding drugs in the vehicle, the tribal officer called 
a state trooper, who arrested the non-Indian driver for a DWI and had his truck impounded off 
the reservation. The next day, the Lummi Tribal Court issued a “Notice of Seizure and Intent to 
Institute Forfeiture,” because under the Lummi Nation tribal code, possession of marijuana over 
one ounce is a ground for civil forfeiture.  Eventually, Horton’s Towing released the truck to the 
tribe and Wilson brought suit in federal court against Horton’s Towing and the arresting tribal 
officer.    
 Finding that there was a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the non-Indian had to exhaust his tribal remedies before bringing his suit in federal court.32  After 
stating that in this case, “the threshold question is whether Plaintiff’s claim “bears some direct 
connection to tribal lands,” the Court noted that the driver was found with several containers of 
marijuana in his truck immediately after leaving the tribal casino. Therefore, although the driver 
was stopped on a state road, “one could logically conclude that the forfeiture was a response to 
his unlawful possession of marijuana while on tribal land. So interpreted, the events giving rise 
to the conversion claim reveal a “direct connection to tribal lands.”33  
 
3. Nevada v. Hicks:34 The origin of the confusion.    
 
Nevada v. Hicks involved a lawsuit filed in tribal court by a member of the Fallon Paiute-
Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada against the State of Nevada and its state officials. Hicks 
 
29 If., at 459, stating “Neither regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway accident at 
issue is needed to preserve “the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them.” 
30 See for instance discussion of MacArthur v. San Juan County, infra at notes 67-73 and Belcourt Public 
School District v. Herman, infra at notes 59-60. 
31 906 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2018).  
32 The requirement that a party should first exhaust the available tribal remedies before filing in federal 
court arguing that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction was first promulgated in National Farmers 
Union v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856–57, (1985) and Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15–
16, (1987) 
33 906 F.3d at 780. See also Employer’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Branch, 381 F.Supp.3d 1144 (2019) 
where the court found that none of the contracts made by a non-reservation  Insurance Co. with a non-
Indian contractor, whose employees negligently caused a massive fuel leak on the reservation, were made 
on the reservation.  Therefore, the Insurance Co. was not subject to the jurisdiction of the tribal court.     
34 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
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alleged that state game wardens had violated his civil rights and damaged his property when they 
came on the reservation to search his house for evidence related to an off-reservation crime, 
hunting out of season, he was alleged to have committed. The State's game wardens were acting 
pursuant to warrants issued by both the state and the tribal court.  The main issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction over the non-member defendants.  
The Tribe’s main argument was that that the Montana analysis was not applicable since the non-
member state law enforcement officials’ activities relevant to the lawsuit took place on Indian 
owned land. 
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for the Court and held that the tribal court lacked 
jurisdiction.  Although he was joined by five other Justices, Justice Souter wrote a concurring 
opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, where he stated “While I agree with the Court's 
analysis as well as its conclusion, I would reach that point by a different route... [w]hile the 
Court gives emphasis to measuring tribal authority here in light of the State's interest in 
executing its own legal process to enforce state law governing off-reservation conduct, I would 
go right to Montana's rule.”35 Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and 
Stevens, concurring in part and arguing that while she was concurring in the result because she 
believed the state officials had sovereign immunity, she would have remanded to the lower 
courts on the issue of whether the tribe had jurisdiction under the Montana exceptions.   
The question here is why did Justice Scalia not go directly to the Montana rule as Justice 
Souter did?  There are, I think, three possible interpretations of Justice Scalia’s opinion.  
The first one, followed in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits,36 is that Scalia was in fact just 
performing a Montana analysis. Under that interpretation, Hicks stands for the proposition that 
the Montana general rule of no-tribal jurisdiction over non-members extends to all lands within 
Indian reservations.  For sure, language used by Justice Scalia towards the end the end of the 
Opinion suggested as much when he stated  
“tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off 
reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations—
to “the right to make laws and be ruled by them.” The State's interest in execution of 
process is considerable, and even when it relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs 
the tribe's self-government than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state 
government.37 
 
35 Id., at 375.   
36 See discussion infra at notes 50-66. 
37 533 U.S. at 364. 
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 A second interpretation of the Scalia Opinion, followed in the latest Tenth Circuit opinion,38 
is that the Court considered the state law enforcement interests at issue because its holding is 
limited to denying tribal jurisdiction over state law enforcement officials conducting criminal 
investigations on the reservation. This was the position taken by Justice Ginsburg in her short 
concurring opinion 39  Also supporting that interpretation is the majority’s statement in a footnote 
that “our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal court jurisdiction over state 
officers enforcing state law.  We leave open the question of tribal court jurisdiction over 
nonmember defendants in general.”40 Under that interpretation, the Court does consider the 
state’s interests in law enforcement but it does so in a Montana type analysis to determine 
whether it outweighs the Tribal interest in self-government as described in the second Montana 
exception.    
A third possible understanding of the opinion, followed by the Ninth Circuit,41  is that 
Justice Scalia first determined that the tribe had in fact lost the right to exclude state agents from 
the reservation in cases involving circumstances such as were present here.  Thus, instead of first 
evaluating whether any of the Montana exceptions apply, courts should proceed on debating the 
importance of the state’s interests inside the reservation to determine whether the Tribe has lost 
the right to exclude these state law-enforcement officials from Indian-owned lands. In other 
words, the balancing of the tribal and state interests at stake is done to determine if the tribe has 
lost the right to exclude.  It is only after the Tribe is found to have lost the right to exclude that 
the Montana analysis becomes applicable.   
4. Post Hicks Supreme Court cases. 
Although the Supreme Court had a possibility to comment on Hicks twice since 2001, neither 
cases added much to the debate. In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Ranch,42 the issue 
was whether a tribal court had jurisdiction over a lawsuit brought by tribal members claiming 
that a non-Indian bank had discriminated against them in the sale of a parcel of non-Indian fee 
land within the reservation. The Supreme Court held that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over 
the non-member defendant because the tribe had lost the right to regulate the sale of non-Indian 
fee land on the reservation. Allowing the tribe to invoke its tort law in this case would allow the 
tribal court to control the sale of such non-Indian fee land.  The Court hardly mentioned Hicks.43  
 
38 See Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe, 862 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2017) and discussion infra at notes 67-74. 
39 533 U.S. 353, at 386 (Justice Ginsburg concurring.)  
40 Id., at footnote 2.  
41 See discussion, infra, at notes 75-100. 
42 554 U.S. v. 316 (2008) 
43 Although it did quote from the opinion for the purposes of stating “Tribal assertion of regulatory 
authority over nonmembers must be connected to that right of the Indians to make their own laws and be 
governed by them.” Id., at 335. 
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However, it did state that Montana’s “general rule restricts tribal authority over nonmember 
activities taking place on the reservation, and is particularly strong when the nonmember's 
activity occurs on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians,”44 thus at least implying that 
Montana was applicable to activities on both Indian and non-Indian land within the reservations.   
Of course, it is essential to understand that the debate here is not whether the Montana 
analysis is applicable to all reservation lands.  It clearly potentially is.  The debate is when 
should the analysis take place: directly as Justice Souter did in Hicks, or after the Court weighs 
the state interest as Justice Scalia arguably did.      
The other case, Dolgencorp v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, ended in a 4-4 draw 
without a decision,45 thereby affirming the decision below which had upheld tribal court 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian Corporation.46 The 5th Circuit in Dolgencorp had upheld tribal 
jurisdiction over a lawsuit by the Tribe against a non-Indian corporation whose employee was 
alleged to have sexually abused a minor tribal member who was working for the corporation at a 
store located on tribal land.  The Circuit court upheld tribal jurisdiction under Montana’s 
commercial relationship exception,47 and never mentioned, let alone discuss Nevada v. Hicks 
even though the alleged wrongdoing occurred on land the tribe had leased to the corporation.48 
Needless to say, the three Hicks plurality opinions and the perplexing structure of Scalia’s 
main opinion have created a divergence of opinions among the lower courts for the last twenty 
years.  The Supreme Court has never revisited the issue since the only opinion issues since Hicks 
in the area of tribal jurisdiction over non-members involved non-Indian fee land.49 The next Part 
discusses the various positions adopted by the Circuits and proposes to re-imagine Hicks as a 
state jurisdiction case.         
PART II: The Federal Circuits debate on when to extend Montana to Indian owned 
lands within reservations. 
1. The 7th and 8th Circuits approach:  interpreting Hicks as always extending 
Montana to all reservation lands owned by the Tribes or their members.  
 
The first category of cases are those that have followed Justice Souter’s Hicks concurrence 
and have extended Montana directly to all lands within the reservations, Indian and non-Indian 
owned.  In Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
 
44 Id., at 328. 
45 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) 
46 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).  
47 Id., at 173-174.  
48 It seems that the District Court in the case had adopted a broad interpretation of Hicks and the Tribe 
decided to focus its appeal on the applicability of the Montana exceptions. 846 F.Supp.2d 646, 651. 
49 See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008).  
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Indians,50 the Seventh Circuit specifically disagreed with the proposition that Hicks was of 
limited applicability when it came to tribal jurisdiction over Indian owned lands.  The case 
involved a lawsuit filed by a tribal entity in tribal court wanting to invalidate a sale of tribal 
bonds made with a non-Indian bank. The sale of the bonds occurred on Indian owned land.  
  
Answering the tribal argument that Montana only applies to situations in which tribes 
attempt to regulate nonmember conduct on non-Indian fee land, as opposed to tribal trust land, 
the court stated “We do not believe that these conclusions can be reconciled with the language 
that the Court employed in Hicks.”51  The court first focused on language in Hicks stating that 
“The ownership status of land, is only one factor to consider in determining whether regulation 
of the activities of nonmembers is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations.”52 The court then analyzed  Plains Commerce Bank, and concluded that the 
statement that Montana 's “general rule restricts tribal authority over nonmember activities 
taking place on the reservation, and is particularly strong when the nonmember's activity occurs 
on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians”53 left no doubt that ”Montana applies regardless of 
whether the actions take place on fee or non-fee land.”54 
 
The Eight Circuit has also adopted a broad definition of Hicks. In Attorney’s Process and 
Investigation v. Sac and Fox Tribe,55 the non-Indian defendant (API) had sent a group of armed 
men to take over the tribal casino on behalf of a competing tribal political faction.  Although the 
Court relied on the second Montana exception (threat to tribal health and welfare, political 
integrity and economic security) to uphold the jurisdiction of the tribal court,56 it stated  
 
Although the issue in the Montana case was about tribal regulatory authority over 
nonmember fee land within the reservation, Montana's analytic framework now sets the 
outer limits of tribal civil jurisdiction—both regulatory and adjudicatory—over 
nonmember activities on tribal and nonmember land... The Court has also indicated that 
“Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land.”57 
 
 
50 807 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 2015) 
51 Id., at 207. 
52 Id. 
53 Id., at 206-207 
54 Id., at 208. 
55 609 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2010).  
56 Stating “because API's forceful intervention on October 1, 2003 threatened the “political integrity, the 
economic security, [and] the health [and] welfare” of the Tribe, as well as its rights as a landowner, the 
tribal courts may exercise jurisdiction over the claims that arise out of that conduct,” Id., at 940.  
57 Id., at 936.  
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Towards the end of its opinion the Court did mention that the tribe had a right to exclude non-
members from tribally owned land but it only invoked that right as part of the Montana 
framework.58    
 
In a more recent case, Belcourt Public School District v. Herman,59 the 8th Circuit 
applied Montana to deny tribal jurisdiction over the school district on what may have been 
Indian-owned land.  The case involved multiple employment related claims by tribal employees 
against the school district.  Although the status of the land as Indian or non-Indian owned was 
not clear, the Court disposed of this issue by stating in a footnote “there is scant evidence in the 
record what, if any, land and facilities relevant to this case were owned by the Tribe. 
Nevertheless, even if the Tribe owned all of the land and facilities relevant to this case—which is 
not supported by the record—Montana would still apply, and our analysis would not change.”60 
The Court never mentioned the tribal right to exclude.  
The first part of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hicks tends to support the 7th and 8th 
Circuits position.  Thus, after stating that “Both Montana and Strate rejected tribal authority to 
regulate nonmembers' activities on land over which the tribe could not “assert a landowner's 
right to occupy and exclude,”61 and remarking that the land status was central to the analysis of 
the Court in previous cases, he concluded that “the reason that was so was not that Indian 
ownership suspends the “general proposition”… that “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian 
tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe”62 He followed that by noting that 
the Montana Court clearly implied that its general rule was applicable throughout the reservation 
when it stated that Indian tribes retain some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians “even on 
non-Indian fee lands.”63  Finally after remarking that who owns the land is only one factor to 
 
58 Stating “Finally, there remains “the critical importance of land status” to questions of tribal 
jurisdiction… Here the Tribe does not seek to assert jurisdiction over non Indian fee land. The facilities 
API raided are on tribal trust land. The Tribe's trespass and trade secret claims thus seek to regulate API's 
entry and conduct upon tribal land, and they accordingly “stem from the tribe's ‘landowner's right to 
occupy and exclude... Tribal civil authority is at its zenith when the tribe seeks to enforce regulations 
stemming from its traditional powers as a landowner.  609 F.3d at 940. 
59 786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015).  
60 Id., at 660 n.5. For an almost identical 8th Circuit case, see Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Murphy, 
786 F.3d 670 (8th Cir. 2015), stating at footnote 6, “]T]his court is aware that “[t]he ownership status of 
land” is “one factor to consider in determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is 
‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.’ ”  As noted above, however, 
there is scant evidence in the record what land and facilities relevant to this case were owned by the Tribe. 
Nevertheless, even if the Tribe owned all of the land and facilities relevant to this case—which is not 
supported by the record—Montana would still apply, and our analysis would not change for the reasons 
stated herein.” 
61 Id., at 359. 
62 Id. 
63 Id., at 360. 
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consider in determining whether tribal regulation of nonmembers is necessary to protect tribal 
self-government, he stated “the existence of tribal ownership is not alone enough to support 
regulatory jurisdiction over non-members.”64   
In a later part of the opinion, after remarking that the major criticism of Justice O’Connor’s  
concurrence was that “our reasoning “gives only passing consideration to the fact that the state 
officials' activities in this case occurred on land owned and controlled by the Tribes,”65  Justice 
Scalia asserted   
To the contrary, we acknowledge that tribal ownership is a factor in 
the Montana analysis, and a factor significant enough that it “may sometimes be ... 
dispositive.”  We simply do not find it dispositive in the present case, when weighed 
against the State's interest in pursuing off-reservation violations of its laws.66   
This statement implies that it was a “Montana analysis” that the Court was performing.  But 
what of Justice Scalia invocation of the State’s interests in law enforcement before concluding 
that the Tribal court did not have jurisdiction in the case?  The State’s interests had never been 
part of any Montana analysis under which the courts are supposed to evaluate whether 
jurisdiction of non-members is necessary to tribal self-government.  There are two other 
interpretations of the Court’s Hicks opinion that make more sense of Scalia’s invocation of the 
state interests.  
2. The Tenth Circuit approach: From a broad interpretation of Hicks to one limiting it to 
cases involving strong state law enforcement interests.   
 
An early Tenth Circuit decision was MacArthur v. San Juan County.67  The case involved 
tribal members employed by a health clinic who were challenging certain administrative actions 
taken by the clinic. Whether the alleged wrongful conduct of the non-members occurred on what 
can be classified as Indian or non-Indian fee land was debatable. Although the clinic started out 
as part of a County Health Services district, the County relinquished operation of the Clinic on 
January 1, 2000, at which time the Utah Navajo Health Systems, an entity affiliated with the 
Navajo tribe, took over operation.  Although the Tenth Circuit took the position that “The record 
indicates that the land on which the Clinic is located is fee land owned by the State of Utah as 
part of the Navajo Trust Fund,”68  it did address Hicks’s extension to Indian owned land, stating   
 
The notion that Montana's applicability turns, in part, on whether the regulated activity 
took place on non-Indian land was finally put to rest in Hicks. …  Because the activities 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id., at 370.  
66 Id.  
67 497 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 2007).  
68 Id., at 1061. 
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occurred on Indian land, Hicks argued that Montana had no relevance.  In rejecting that 
argument, the Court explained that… language from Montana itself clearly implied that 
the general rule announced in that case applies to Indian and non-Indian land alike.69  
 
In a more recent decision, however, Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe,70 the Tenth Circuit 
seemed to take a much narrower view of Hicks.  In Norton, the Ute Tribe was suing state police 
officers who had trespassed unto tribal land while chasing a car occupied by a pair of tribal 
members. In the ensuing pursuit, Murray who was the passenger in the fleeing car ended up dead 
from a gunshot wound to the head.  The parties disagreed as to whether Murray committed 
suicide as the state police claimed or whether he was shot by the police.  
 
The Court first addressed the right to exclude and stated “In light of these repeated 
confirmations of tribes' right to exclude nonmembers from tribal lands, we think it plausible that 
the Tribal Court possesses jurisdiction over the trespass claim.”71 The Court then addressed the 
argument that Hicks had changed the lay of the land.  After noting that the Hicks Court 
“expressly limited its holding to “the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers 
enforcing state law,”72 the Tenth Circuit stated “Thus, the question before us is whether this case 
sufficiently mirrors Hicks so as to compel its narrow holding to apply.”73   
 
The Court went on to observe that the facts in this case were much different from those in 
Hicks since the tribal member who died from the gun shot was not suspected of having 
committed any off-reservation crime. Although the driver of the car was speeding outside of the 
Reservation, Murray (the tribal member who died) was merely a passenger. Thus, the Court 
concluded by stating “To the extent that Murray’s running away from State Trooper Swenson 
could be considered an offense, see Utah Code § 41-6a-209 (disobeying a lawful order of a law 
enforcement officer), this crime does not fit within Hicks' confines.”74 In effect, the Tenth Circuit 
in Norton took the position that in order for Hicks to be controlling, the State has to put forth a 
substantial law enforcement interest.  
 
3. The Ninth Circuit approach:  From a narrow interpretation of Hicks to rejecting 
the application of Montana when tribes have preserved the right to exclude. 
 
The third category of cases are out of the Ninth Circuit.  The first Ninth Circuit case to 
discuss the meaning of Hicks, was McDonald v. Means.75 The issue involved an assertion of 
tribal court jurisdiction over a tort resulting from a collision on a federal Bureau of Indian 
 
69 Id., at 1069-70.  
70 862 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2017). 
71 Id., at 1245. 
72 Id., at 1248. 
73 Id. 
74 d., at 1248. 
75 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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Affairs’ road.  The non-member defendant argued that Hicks extended Montana to all lands 
within the reservation.  After noting that the Hicks Court had limited its holding to the question 
of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the limited nature of Hicks's holding was not applicable to this case. Among the 
distinguishing factors was the fact that the Tribe here had continued to exercise control over the 
road where the incident took place.76   
 
Perhaps the first 9th Circuit decision to discuss the role of the right to exclude in a Montana 
analysis was Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court.77  The issue was whether the tribal 
court had jurisdiction to hear a case brought by the tribe against a non-member who set a signal 
fire after she got lost on the reservation and that fire ended up burning 400,000 acres of tribal 
timber. After acknowledging that determining the scope of tribal court jurisdiction was not an 
easy task, the court noted that here, it only needed to determine whether tribal jurisdiction was 
plausible since the issue was whether the non-member had to first exhaust her tribal remedies 
before filing her case in federal court.78  In deciding that tribal jurisdiction was in fact plausible, 
the 9th Circuit Court examined the Supreme Court precedents and noted      
 
The Supreme Court has strongly suggested that a tribe may regulate nonmembers' 
conduct on tribal lands to the extent that the tribe can “assert a landowner's right to 
occupy and exclude. The tribal regulations at issue stem from the tribe's “landowner's 
right to occupy and exclude.”…  Accordingly, the tribe's ownership of the land may be 
dispositive here.79  
 
The Court further rejected the argument that Hicks precluded tribal jurisdiction.  Although the 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Hicks Court held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction 
notwithstanding tribal ownership of the land, it stated that “the crux of the Court's reasoning was 
that the state's strong interest in executing its criminal warrants concerning an off-reservation 
crime outweighed the tribe's interest in regulating the activities of “state wardens.”80 
 
76 Id., at 540.  
77 566 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2009). An earlier case, Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (2006) 
discussed Hicks but instead of discussing whether the tribe had kept its right to exclude, it focused on how 
the claims were related to tribal land, stating “The interaction of these factors—the status of the parties 
and the connection between the cause of action and Indian lands—is complex…Our own cases, however, 
suggest that whether tribal courts may exercise jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant may turn on 
how the claims are related to tribal lands.“ Id., at 1132.  A later 9th circuit opinion, Window Rock v. 
Reeves, 861 F.3d 894 (2017), acknowledged that “Although Smith v. Salish Kootenai College could 
arguably be read to extend the Montana framework [to Indian owned land], the jurisdictional question 
in Smith arose in a different context from the one presented here. In Smith, a nonmember challenged a 
tribal court’s authority to adjudicate a claim that he had filed as a plaintiff in tribal court.  We held that by 
filing the claim, the nonmember had consented to tribal jurisdiction.” Id., at Footnote 9.    
78 Id., at 849. See discussion supra at note 42 on exhaustion tribal court remedies. 
79 566 F.3d at 849-850.  
80 Id., at 850.  




The Ninth Circuit adopted a somewhat different approach in 2011 in what would become 
its leading case, Water Wheel v. LaRance.81 The case arose out of a dispute involving a lease 
between the Colorado Indian Tribes and its lessee, Water Wheel, which operated a recreational 
resort on leased tribal lands.  After the lease expired and Water Wheel refused to vacate the 
premises, the Tribe sued Water Wheel and its owner in tribal Court.  Water Wheel challenged the 
jurisdiction of the tribal court in Federal court.  Although the Ninth Circuit first stated that Hicks 
was limited to cases involving strong state law enforcement interests,82 it ended upholding tribal 
court jurisdiction over the non-Indian lessee on a slightly different rationale, stating   
   
In this instance, where the non-Indian activity in question occurred on tribal land, the 
activity interfered directly with the tribe's inherent powers to exclude and manage its own 
lands, and there are no competing state interests at play, the tribe's status as landowner is 
enough to support regulatory jurisdiction without considering Montana.83  
 
The Ninth Circuit revisited the issue two years later in Grand Canyon Skywalk 
Development v. 'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc.84  In that case, a non-Indian corporation, Grand Canyon 
Skywalk, had brought a lawsuit against a tribally chartered corporation of the Hualapai Indian 
Tribe, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Hualapai Tribe lacked the authority to condemn 
Grand Canyon Skywalk’s property rights in a revenue-sharing contract with a tribally chartered 
corporation.  The Ninth Circuit held that the non-Indian Corporation had to exhaust its tribal 
remedies before bringing an action in federal court because the tribal court did not plainly lack 
jurisdiction over that corporation so as to avoid the tribal exhaustion mandate.85   
In extending Water Wheel to the present case, the court stated  “Although this case 
involves an intangible property right within a contract, rather than a leasehold as 
in Water Wheel, the contract in this case equally interfered with the Hualapai's ability to exclude 
GCSD from the reservation.”86  Summarizing its interpretation of Hicks, the Court stated “ When 
deciding whether a tribal court has jurisdiction, land ownership may sometimes prove 
dispositive, but when a competing state interest exists, courts balance that interest against the 
tribe's.”87  
 
81 642 F.3d 802 9th Cir. 2011).  
82 Id., at 813. stating “To summarize, Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, as well as the principle 
that only Congress may limit a tribe's sovereign authority, suggest that Hicks is best understood as the 
narrow decision it explicitly claims to be. Its application of Montana to a jurisdictional question arising 
on tribal land should apply only when the specific concerns at issue in that case exist.” 
83 642 F.3d 802, 814. 
84 715 F.3d 1196 (2013) 
85 The Grand Canyon Skywalk court further stated “We have interpreted National Farmers as determining 
that tribal court exhaustion is not a jurisdictional bar, but rather a prerequisite to a federal court's exercise 
of its jurisdiction. Therefore, under National Farmers, the federal courts should not even make a ruling on 
tribal court jurisdiction ... until tribal remedies are exhausted.” Id., at 1200.  
86 Id., at 1204–05. 
87 Id., at 1205.  
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Extending Hicks to the activities of non-members on tribal land was also at play in 
Window Rock Unified District v. Reeves.88  There, employees of two school districts filed 
complaints with the Navajo Tribal Labor Commission, arguing that the Districts owed them 
merit pay and also alleging violation of the Navajo Preference in Employment Act .  Before the 
Commission could hold evidentiary hearings, the School Districts filed a lawsuit in federal court, 
arguing that the Commission and the Navajo tribal courts had no jurisdiction over the School 
Districts’ employment decisions.  As in the Grand Canyon Skywalk case, the issue in front of the 
Ninth Circuit was whether the School District should exhaust its tribal remedies before filing in 
federal court.   
The Ninth Circuit first remarked that caselaw has recognized two distinct frameworks for 
deciding tribal jurisdiction over non-members on Indian owned lands: “(1) The right to exclude 
which generally applies to nonmember conducts on tribal land and (2) the exceptions articulated 
in Montana v. United States which generally apply to nonmember conduct on non-tribal land.”89  
Answering arguments that Hicks had eliminated the right to exclude framework the court stated  
[t]oday we reaffirm that the right-to-exclude framework continues to exist. Our court has 
read Hicks as creating only a narrow exception to the general rule that, absent contrary 
provisions in treaties or federal statutes, tribes retain adjudicative authority over 
nonmember conduct on tribal land—land over which the tribe has the right to exclude. 
We have held that Hicks applies “only when the specific concerns at issue in that case 
exist.”90  
 One of the issues in the case was whether Arizona’s interests in regulating education 
were sufficiently important to meet the Hicks threshold.   Although the Court rejected the 
position adopted by the District Court that “any state interest in this case plainly defeats [tribal] 
jurisdiction under Hicks,” it took the position that even though Hicks involved state interests 
dealing with law enforcement, state interests  beyond those affecting criminal law enforcement 
could at times trigger application of Hicks.91  However, the Ninth Circuit concluded by holding 
that “because our caselaw leaves open the question of what state interests might be sufficient to 
preclude tribal jurisdiction over disputes arising on tribal land, tribal jurisdiction is plausible 
enough here that exhaustion is required.”92 
There was a strong dissent from Judge Christen. Although the dissent argued against a 
narrow interpretation of Hicks,93 the more salient part of the dissenting opinion was its argument 
 
88 861 F.3d 894 (2017). 
89 861 F.3d 894, 898.  
90 Id.  
91 Id., at 899 
92 Id. 
93 Id., at 911-912. 
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that even if the majority was correct in adopting a narrow interpretation of Hicks, the Tribe still 
did not have jurisdiction.94  First, the tribe had ceded its right to exclude the school district from 
the reservation.95  Secondly, even if Hicks is interpreted as requiring a strong state interest before 
the Montana framework can be invoked, Arizona here did have a substantial interest relating to 
education.96 
The Reeves dissent considered the State interest but not as part of its right to exclude 
analysis or the Montana analysis.  Instead, it analyzed the state interest in distinguishing previous 
cases such as Water Wheel.  Either the state interest can be discussed as opening the door for a 
Montana analysis or it can be conceived as having eliminated the right to exclude.  Although 
either analysis end up at the same place, this Article takes the position that it is normatively more 
consistent to discuss the state interests in order to determine whether a tribe has lost the right to 
exclude.  
   The most recent Ninth Circuit decision in this area of the law as of this writing is 
Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria.97  The case involved a lawsuit filed in tribal court by the tribe 
against a former non-member employee who was being accused of having defrauded the Tribe.  
The employee sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court claiming that the tribal 
court did not have jurisdiction.  In upholding tribal jurisdiction the Ninth Circuit first rejected the 
employee’s claim that Hicks had eliminated “the right to exclude framework as an independent 
source or regulatory power over non-member conduct on tribal land.”98  The Court also rejected 
the argument that tribal jurisdiction is “limited to conduct that directly interferes with a tribe’s 
inherent power to exclude and manage its own land.99  Finally the Court clarified the meaning of 
Water Wheel, stating     
Water Wheel and our subsequent cases… do not exclude Montana as a source of tribal 
regulatory authority over nonmember conduct on tribal land. Rather, our caselaw states 
that an Indian tribe has power to regulate nonmember conduct on tribal land incident to 
 
94 Unlike the majority the dissent concluded that exhaustion of tribal remedies was not required.  Id., at 
921-922.   
95 Id., at 914-916. 
96 Id., at 916-918, stating “The Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s amicus brief asserts interests in protecting 
Navajo employees and students, and the tribal court’s opening brief asserts interests in hearing complaints 
arising from employment decisions of all-Navajo school boards. But the school boards are political 
subdivisions of the State of Arizona, and Arizona has vitally important competing interests in the finality 
of its state-court judgments and its ability to enforce them. Further, Arizona’s constitution mandates “the 
establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system,” a requirement of the 
Arizona Enabling Act.  It cannot be questioned that Arizona has a compelling interest in complying with 
its statutory and state constitutional mandate.” Id., at 917. 
97 922 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2019). 
98 Id., at 900. 
99 Id., at 901. 
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its sovereign power to exclude nonmembers from tribal land, regardless of whether either 
of the Montana exceptions is satisfied… a tribe's power to regulate nonmember conduct 
on tribal land flows from its inherent power to exclude and is circumscribed only to 
the limited extent that the circumstances in Hicks—significant state interests—are 
present.100 
 
4. Conclusion to Part II and re-imagining Hicks as a state Jurisdiction case.  
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit position as clarified in Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria is the 
more doctrinally sound approach among the Circuits.101 Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks should 
be interpreted as creating a two-step analysis before tribal jurisdiction over non-members on 
Indian-owned land could be said to have been divested.  First, a court should determine if the 
Tribe has lost the right to exclude. If the answer is yes, the court should determine if the tribe can 
exercise jurisdiction under one of the two Montana exceptions.  
Conceptualizing Hicks in that manner makes the most sense out of Justice Scalia’s invocation 
of the State interest.  Although considering the state interests either as divesting the tribes’ of the 
right to exclude or as part of the Montana analysis may lead to the same result, construing 
Scalia’s opinion as integrating a state interest into the Montana analysis lacks any doctrinal 
basis. The implicit divestiture doctrine was never about tribes losing inherent sovereignty 
because of a state interest. The State interest should only be taken into consideration in 
determining whether a tribe has lost its inherent right to exclude.  
There is hardly any law on what kind of state interest is sufficient or important enough to 
overcome a tribe’s right to exclude.  Whether the important state interest has to be related to law 
enforcement is debatable.  For instance, in answering Justice O’Connor’s accusation that the 
Court’s opinion would  “give nonmembers freedom to act with impunity on tribal land based 
solely on their status as state law enforcement officials,”102 Justice Scalia stated “We do not say 
state officers cannot be regulated; we say they cannot be regulated in the performance of their 
law enforcement duties.  Action unrelated to that is potentially subject to tribal control depending 
on the outcome of the Montana analysis.”103  Although I do not take the position that a state 
interest has to be tied to law enforcement as it was in Hicks, it seems to me that the state interest 
should somehow be connected to state officials needing to be on Indian owned land or having the 
legal right to be on such lands.  
 
100 Id., at 903.  The Ninth Circuit also added that a “tribe also has sovereign authority to regulate 
nonmember conduct on tribal lands independent of its authority to exclude if that conduct intrudes on a 
tribe's inherent sovereign power to preserve self-government or control internal relations.” Id., at 904.  
101 For an even better approach, see discussion supra at notes…. About re-imagining Hicks as a state 
jurisdiction case.   
102 Id., at 373. 
103 Id., at 373-374. 
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In order to avoid all the confusion surrounding the proper understanding of Hicks, perhaps 
that case should not be viewed as tinkering with the Montana analysis by introducing a balancing 
of tribal and state interest but should be re-imagined as a State Jurisdiction case.  In other words, 
rather than decide the case using Montana to hold that the tribal court had been implicitly 
divested of jurisdiction, the Court should have used the Indian Preemption doctrine to hold that 
because the State had jurisdiction to send its game wardens on the reservation, tribal jurisdiction 
to regulate such state officials had been preempted.  
Under the Indian preemption doctrine, as stated by the Court in White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker,104 the inquiry determining whether a state has jurisdiction “is not dependent on 
mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a 
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry 
designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would 
violate federal law.”105  In a case decided shortly thereafter, the Court further refined the Indian 
Preemption doctrine as a balancing inquiry, stating “State jurisdiction is preempted by the 
operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests 
reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of 
State authority.”106 
At one point in the Court’s Hicks opinion, it seemed that Justice Scalia was going to do 
such a balancing inquiry. Thus, after stating that “Our cases make clear that the Indians' right to 
make their own laws and be governed by them does not exclude all state regulatory authority on 
the reservation. State sovereignty does not end at a reservation's border,”107 Justice Scalia 
focused on the right of states to run “process” inside the reservations which he claimed had been 
recognized since the 1880’s.”108 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Process” as “any means used 
by a court to acquire or exercise its jurisdiction over a person or over specific property.”109  
Justice Scalia added that “While it is not entirely clear from our precedent whether the last 
mentioned authority entails the corollary right to enter a reservation (including Indian-fee lands) 
for enforcement purposes, several of our opinions point in that direction.”110   
 
104 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
105 Id., at 145.  
106 New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1980).   
107 Id., at 361. 
108 Stating “The Court's references to “process” in Utah & Northern R. Co. and Kagama, and the Court's 
concern in Kagama over possible federal encroachment on state prerogatives, suggest state authority to 
issue search warrants in cases such as the one before us.” Id., at 361. 
109 Black's Law Dictionary 1084 (5th ed.1979). 
110 Id., at 363. 
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Justice Scalia also invoked Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Reservation,111 for the proposition that states can even have jurisdiction over Indian tribes and 
their members on Indian reservations.112  True enough, the Court has in the past stated that 
“[U]nder certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activities of 
nonmembers on a reservation, and ... in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction 
over the on-reservation activities of tribal members.”113  Following this reasoning, I was 
expecting Justice Scalia to next argue that the State had the power to enter the reservation and 
assume jurisdiction over Hicks because of exceptional circumstances, thereby abrogating the 
tribe’s right to exclude. Justice Scalia could have then argued that the state law enforcement 
interests in this case pre-empted tribal jurisdiction because dual tribal/state regulations over the 
activities of state officials would have not been possible nor practical.   
In that manner, the case could have been similar to New Mexico v. Mescalero Tribe but in 
reverse.114  In Mescalero, the state was attempting to regulate non-members hunting and fishing 
on the reservation but the Court held that such state regulations were preempted because, among 
other things, both tribal and state regulations could not co-exist.115  For whatever reason, Justice 
Scalia did not continue along this path and abruptly shifted to an implicit divestiture mode of 
analysis, balancing the tribal and state interests not to determine whether the state should have 
jurisdiction but to conclude that tribal jurisdiction in this case was not necessary to tribal self-
government.116      
From a tribal perspective, however, I believe that it would have been better if the Court 
had invoked exceptional circumstances and used the Indian preemption doctrine to affirm state 
 
111 447 U.S. 134 (1980).  
112 533 U.S. 353, 362, stating “When, however, state interests outside the reservation are implicated, 
States may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land, as exemplified by our 
decision in Confederated Tribes. In that case, Indians were selling cigarettes on their reservation to 
nonmembers from off reservation, without collecting the state cigarette tax. We held that the State could 
require the Tribes to collect the tax from nonmembers, and could “impose at least ‘minimal’ burdens on 
the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing and collecting the tax.” 
113 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214–16 (U.S.Cal.,1987). 
114 462 U.S. 324 (1980).  
115 Id., at 338, stating “It is important to emphasize that concurrent jurisdiction would effectively nullify 
the Tribe's authority to control hunting and fishing on the reservation. Concurrent jurisdiction would 
empower New Mexico wholly to supplant tribal regulations. The State would be able to dictate the terms 
on which nonmembers are permitted to utilize the reservation's resources. The Tribe would thus exercise 
its authority over the reservation only at the sufferance of the State.” 
116 533 U.S. 353, at 364. Perhaps Justice Scalia abandoned this line of reasoning because even though the 
Court had used the Indian preemption inquiry to allow state power over Indians under “exceptional 
circumstances,” it had never used the Indian preemption doctrine to prohibit tribal jurisdiction over non-
members. But that is probably dues to the fact that most of the state jurisdiction cases are tax cases and in 
the tax area, concurrent tribal and state jurisdiction is possible.  See Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 
490 U.S. 163 (1988).  
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jurisdiction in order to preempt tribal jurisdiction. There would have been then no need to further 
denigrate tribal sovereignty and there would have been no questions that the implicit divestiture 
doctrine was being extended to Indian owned land.  
PART III: THE TREATY RIGHT TO EXCLUDE BEYOND MONTANA AND HICKS. 
1. Is the treaty right to exclude different than the sovereign right to exclude?   
Although tribes have been surprisingly successful in getting the Supreme Court to uphold 
their treaty rights, the same cannot be said for cases relying on tribal inherent sovereignty to 
control the conduct of non-tribal members.117  The question, therefore, is whether tribes with a 
treaty right to exclude may be better off focusing on their treaty rights rather than on their 
“inherent” sovereign power to exclude.  Some scholars do not think it makes much difference.  
One of the more forceful statement for treating both treaty and non-treaty reservations alike was 
made by Professor Royster,  
If tribes with reservations established by statute or executive order have the same rights 
to water and the same rights to hunt and fish as tribes with reservations established by 
treaty, then by what argument would they not have the same right to the use and 
occupation of their lands? …Particular treaties, statutes, or executive orders may speak of 
a tribal right to use and occupy the reservation, but that language merely clarifies or 
affirms the federal guarantee implicit in the establishment of the reservation. Whether 
that use and occupation right arises from an actual treaty or the treaty-equivalent of a 
statute or executive order should make no difference.118 
While I do not disagree with Professor Royster’s statement, I think the difference between an 
inherent sovereign right and a treaty right to exclude comes in when a court has to determine 
whether the right to exclude has been lost.  Under my interpretation of Hicks, without a treaty, a 
court would have to decide whether there are state interests that are important enough so that the 
tribe has lost the right to exclude.  If the right to exclude is based on a treaty, however, the 
question should be whether there are clear indications of congressional intent to abrogate the 
treaty right to exclude.119   
 
117 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Supreme Court’s last 30 Years of Federal Indian Law: Looking for 
Equilibrium or Supremacy, 8 Colum. J. Race & L. 277, at 287-289 (2018).  
118 See Royster, supra at n. 13, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 889, 921. 
119 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). Stating “where the evidence of congressional intent to 
abrogate is sufficiently compelling, “the weight of authority indicates that such an intent can also be 
found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the legislative history of a statute.” What 
is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on 
the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the 
treaty.” Id., at 739–40. 
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Some may argue that all Indian tribes, whether they have treaty rights or not,  should be 
treated equally and have the same rights on their own reservations.  Such argument, however, 
denigrates the historical and legal importance of treaties made with Indian nations.  While it is 
true that Federal Indian law has been homogenized, at first mostly through the Supreme Court’s 
use of Federal Common Law, and then by federal statutes treating all Indian tribes generically, 
this was not always so.  For about the first one hundred years, except for the Indian Trade and 
Intercourse Acts,120 the relations between the federal government and each Indian tribe was 
mostly governed through particular treaties.121  Some noted scholars, such as Vine Deloria and 
Saikrishna Prakash, have criticized the move towards homogenization,122 arguing that such move 
was made for the purpose of assuming federal power over Indians.123 Certainly, the so-called 
federal plenary power doctrine over Indian tribes and the implicit divestiture doctrine are fine 
examples of this strategy. 
In the next section I discuss then differences between the inherent and treaty  right to 
exclude has fared in two Supreme Court cases. One was based on the inherent sovereign right to 
exclude, the other on a treaty right to exclude.   
2. The treaty and sovereign right to exclude at the Supreme Court.  
A. Merrion v. Jicarilla Tribe:124 The right to exclude as a sovereign right. 
A year after Montana, the Court had the opportunity to debate the right to exclude as an 
inherent sovereign right. The issue in Merrion involved the Jicarilla Apache’s power to impose 
an additional tax on a non-Indian corporation, Merrion, that had leased lands from the tribe for 
the purpose of energy development. Merrion argued that because its lease with the tribe did not 
provide for the imposition of new taxes, the tribal tax was precluded.  The Court upheld the new 
tribal tax. The difference between the majority opinion penned by Justice Marshall and the 
 
120 The first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act was enacted in 1790, Act of July 22, 1 Stat 137.   The last 
one was enacted in 1834, 4 Stat. 729.  
121 In 1871, Congress enacted a statute prohibiting the United States from entering into treaties with 
Indian Nations but reaffirming the validity of existing treaties, 16 Stat. 566 (March 3, 1871).  
122 See Vine Deloria Jr, Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 963 (1996) (criticizing Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law because “it was designed to 
present a homogenous body of law in which few questions remained” and  concluding that “Newer 
versions of the handbook have simply built upon old and weak foundations, failing to articulate either 
Indian rights or federal responsibility clearly. Id., at 979) 
123 See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1069 (2004). See also Ezra 
Rosser. Ambiguity and the Academic: The dangerous Attraction of Pan-Indian Legal Analysis, 119 Harv. 
L. Rev. F. 141 (2005).     
124 455 U.S. 130, 145–47 (1982). 
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dissent by Justice Stevens centered on the nature of the power to exclude and whether the tribal 
power to tax derived solely from the power to exclude.   
Justice Marshall took the position that the tribal power to tax could be derived from either 
inherent tribal sovereignty or the right to exclude which includes other lesser rights such as 
regulating the terms under which anyone not excluded can remain on tribal lands.  Justice 
Stevens argued that the power to tax non-members derived solely from the power to exclude and 
since the lease did not provide for additional taxes, Merrion could not be excluded for refusing to 
pay such taxes. Justice Marshall had this to say about the dissent’s argument:         
[t]he dissent confuse the Tribe's role as commercial partner with its role as sovereign… 
Confusing these two results denigrates Indian sovereignty. Indeed, the dissent apparently 
views the tribal power to exclude, as well as the derivative authority to tax, as merely the 
power possessed by any individual landowner or any social group to attach conditions, 
including a “tax” or fee, to the entry by a stranger onto private land or into the social 
group, and not as a sovereign power.”125    
 
The tribal right in Merrion was, however, a non-treaty right to exclude. As noted by Justice 
Marshall, the difference between the majority and the dissent centered on whether the tribal right 
to exclude was an inherent “sovereign” right or a property owner’s right. 
B. South Dakota v. Bourland:126  The right to exclude as a treaty right.  
The issue in Bourland was whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe had kept its treaty right 
to exclude non-members from hunting on land that was within the reservation but had been taken 
from the tribe for a federal dam and reservoir project.  Relying on Montana, the Court in an 
opinion authored by Justice Thomas held that the Tribe’s treaty right to exclude non-members 
from the reservation, implicit in its rights of “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation,” of 
such lands, as well as its derivative right to regulate non-members while on these lands, was 
implicitly abrogated when the United States took the lands and opened them for the use of the 
general public.127     
The Court also argued that its decision was not in contravention of United States v. Dion,128 
where the Court had held that a treaty right can only be abrogated if there is “clear evidence that 
Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian 
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”129  The 
Court concluded that it could not explain Section 10 of the Cheyenne River Act and section 4 of 
 
125 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 145–47 (1982). 
126 508 U.S. 679 (1993). 
127 Id., at 690. 
128 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
129 Id., at 740 
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the Flood Control Act except as “indications that Congress sought to divest the Tribe of its right 
to “absolute use and occupation.”130 That conclusion was strongly objected to by the dissent 
which stated that the majority:  
points not even to a scrap of evidence that Congress actually considered the possibility 
that by taking the land in question it would deprive the Tribe of its authority to regulate 
non-Indian hunting and fishing on that land. Instead, it finds Congress' intent implicit in 
the fact that Congress deprived the Tribe of its right to exclusive use of the land.131 
 
The Dissent also remarked that although the Court acknowledged the application of cases like 
Dion to this case, “the majority adopts precisely the sort of reasoning-by-implication that those 
cases reject.”132 
 
The Dissent also accused the majority of having a “myopic focus on the Treaty” and ignoring 
the fact that Treaties just confirmed Tribes’ pre-existing sovereign rights over their 
reservations.133  Therefore, according to the dissent “Even on the assumption that the Tribe's 
treaty-based right to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians was lost with the Tribe's power 
to exclude non-Indians, its inherent authority to regulate such hunting and fishing continued.”134  
In effect, although Justice Thomas did state that “General principles of “inherent sovereignty” 
also do not enable the Tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in the taken area,”135  his 
majority opinion in fact remanded the question of whether either of the two Montana exceptions 
applied to the lower court.136  
3. The treaty right to exclude beyond jurisdiction over non-members: Applying federal 
laws of general applicability to Indian tribes.  
Besides being relevant in determining tribal jurisdiction over non-members, the distinction 
between inherent sovereign rights and treaty rights has also played a role in the on-going debate 
among the Circuits about extending federal laws of general applicability to Indian tribes.  These 
are general federal law that do not mention Indian tribes in either the text or the legislative 
history.137  There are currently three official approaches among the Circuits in deciding whether 
to apply a general federal law to Indian tribes.  Under the prevailing approach, first formulated 
 
130 Id., at 693.  
131 Id., at 700 (Blackmun and Souter dissenting.)  
132 Id.  
133 Id., at 701. 
134 Id. 
135 Id., at 694. 
136 Id., at 695-696. 
137 See Alex T. Skibine, Practical Reasoning and the Application of General Federal Regulatory Laws to 
Indian Nations, 22 Washington and Lee J, of Civ. Rights and Soc J. 123, 126 (2016).  
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by the 9th Circuit in Donovan v. Coeur D’Alene,138 there is a presumption that federal laws that 
are generally applicable to everyone are also applicable to Indian tribes.139  The tribes can, 
however, rebut this presumption by showing that the general federal law would interfere with 
“purely intramural aspects of tribal Sovereignty.”140  Under the D.C. Circuit approach as 
formulated in San Manuel Bingo v. NLRB,141 the focus is on whether the general federal law 
would interfere with traditional powers of tribal self-government.142  The Tenth Circuit, on the 
other hand, assumes that any federal law applied to tribes would interfere with tribal self-
government and therefore requires clear indications of congressional intent to apply the law to 
the tribes.143  
While all three approaches acknowledge that the general federal law should not be 
applied to Indian tribes if it interferes with some aspects of tribal self-government, they also 
agree that a general federal law should not be applied if it interferes with a specific treaty right 
unless there is clear evidence that Congress considered the matter and decided to abrogate the 
treaty right.144  This indicates that in this area of the law, Tribes having a treaty right to exclude 
may be better off than those with just a sovereign right to exclude.  Finding clear evidence of 
congressional intent to abrogate a treaty can, however, be a subjective inquiry. The Supreme 
Court in both Montana and Bourland, for instance,  found clear indications of congressional 
intent to eliminate the treaty right to exclude as to non-Indian owned land when Congress had 
either transferred the land to non-Indian ownership, or provided a mechanism for non-Indians to 
acquire land within Indian reservations.145 
When it comes to invoking a treaty right to prevent application of a federal law of general 
applicability, the debate has centered on what kind of treaty right qualifies.  Is a treaty that 
reserves the Indian reservation “for the exclusive use” of the tribe and its members, specific 
 
138 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). 
139 Id., at 1115-1117, relying on FPC v. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
140 Id., at 1116-1117 
141 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
142 Id., at 1312-1313. 
143 See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating “The correct 
presumption is that silence does not work a divestiture of tribal power.)  More recently, a fourth approach 
was suggested by the 6th Circuit in Soaring Eagle Casino v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015)   
Although the panel acknowledged that it was bound by a previous panel’s decision to follow the Coeur 
d’Alene framework, Id., at 662, it severely criticized that approach and argued that a much better 
approach would be to adopt what could be termed a “Montana framework” in determining whether 
application of federal regulatory laws to a reservation-based tribally owned enterprise would infringe on 
tribal sovereignty.  The Soaring Eagle court took the position that the question to be answered in such 
cases was “whether a tribe has the inherent sovereign authority necessary to prevent application of a 
federal statute to tribal activity.” Id., at 666. 
144 See, Skibine, Practical Reasoning, supra at note 137, at p. 130. 
145 See discussion supra at notes 17-20 and 126-136. 
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enough to qualify under the approaches described above. In United States v. Farris146 for 
instance, the Ninth Circuit stated the treaty exception applied “only to subjects specifically 
covered in treaties, such as hunting rights . . . To bring the special rule into play here, general 
treaty language such as that devoting land to a tribe's ‘exclusive use’ is not sufficient, although 
such language does suffice to oust state jurisdiction.”147 
The Ninth Circuit has continued to follow this position.  For instance, in Department of 
Labor v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,148 the issue was the application of 
OSHA to a tribally owned enterprise.  Because the treaty created the reservation for the exclusive 
use of the tribe and stated that “nor shall any white person be permitted to reside upon the same 
without the concurrent permission of the agent and superintendent,” the Occupational Safety and 
Health Commission concluded that the treaty “evidence an intent of the parties to exclude the 
white man from the reservation lands for any and all purposes except as therein 
enumerated.”149 Therefore, according to the Commission, the application of OSHA to the tribe 
would infringe on the tribe's right to exclusive use. On Appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, 
stating, “on the facts before us, we do not find the conflict between the Tribe's right of general 
exclusion and the limited entry necessary to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act to 
be sufficient to bar application of the Act to the Warm Springs mill. The conflict must be more 
direct to bar the enforcement of statutes of general applicability.”150 
      
The Seventh Circuit has followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit.  In Smart v. State 
Farm,151 where the issue was application of ERISA to a tribal healthcare center, the Seventh 
Circuit stated, “Simply because a treaty exists does not by necessity compel a conclusion that a 
federal statute of general applicability is not binding on an Indian Tribe…The critical issue is 
whether application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is secured by the treaty.”152 The 
Court concluded that the treaty in question here did not delineate specific rights.  The treaty 
simply conveyed land to be within the exclusive sovereignty of the Tribe.  
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has adopted a different position on the treaty 
exception.  In Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products,153 the Tenth Circuit held that OSHA was not 
applicable to the tribe because the treaty of 1868 with the Navajo Nation provided that only 
designated federal officials could enter the Navajo reservation.154  Since applying OSHA would 
 
146 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980.) 
147 Id., at 893 
148 935 F.2d 182 (9th Cir 1991).  
149 Id., at 184-85. 
150 Id., at 186-87.  
151 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989). 
152 Id., at 935 
153 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982),  
154 Article II of the treaty, states as follows: [T]he United States agrees that no persons except those herein 
so authorized to do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents and employees of the government, or of the 
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allow federal employees to enter the reservation at any times in order to enforce the statute, the 
court stated 
 
The Navajo Treaty recognizes the Indian sovereignty of the Navajos and their right of 
self-government . . . Application of OSHA to NFPI [Navajo Forest Products Inc.] would 
constitute abrogation of Article II of the Navajo Treaty relating to the exclusion of non-
Indians not authorized to enter upon the Navajo Reservation. Furthermore, it would dilute 
the principles of tribal sovereignty and self-government recognized in the treaty.155 
 
The Tenth Circuit applied Navajo Forest Products in EEOC v. Cherokee 
Nation,156 where the issue was application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) to the Cherokee Nation.  Remarking that in Navajo Forest Products, the court had 
found that application of OSHA would dilute the principles of tribal sovereignty and self-
government recognized in the treaty, the Cherokee Nation court concluded, “The treaty's 
language clearly and unequivocally recognizes tribal self-government with only two express 
exceptions, neither of which is at issue in this case . . . Consequently, we hold that ADEA is not 
applicable because its enforcement would directly interfere with the Cherokee Nation's treaty-
protected right of self-government.”157 
 
The difference of opinion between the 9th and 10th Circuit concerning how specific a 
treaty right has to be before it can prevent the application of a general federal law came to the 
fore more recently in Soaring Eagle Casino v. NLRB,158  a case involving application of the 
National Labor Relations Act to a tribal casino. After acknowledging a split between the Ninth 
and Seventh Circuits on one side and the Tenth on the other, the Sixth Circuit recognized that 
“the question was a close one” but concluded that a treaty right to exclude was insufficient to bar 
application of federal regulatory statutes of general applicability, at least in the absence of a 
“direct conflict between a specific right or exclusion and the entry necessary for effectuating the 
statutory scheme.”159  
 
Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law, or 
the orders of the President, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory 
described in this article. Treaty with the Navaho, 15 Stat. 667 (1868). 
155 692 F.2d at 712. 
156 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989).  
157 Id., at 938.  
158 Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. N.L.R.B., 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015) 
159 Id. at 661, stating “Although, given the protective language employed by the Supreme Court when 
assessing tribal treaty rights, the question is a close one, ultimately we conclude that a general right of 
exclusion, with no additional specificity, is insufficient to bar application of federal regulatory statutes of 
general applicability. Unless there is a direct conflict between a specific right of exclusion and the entry 
necessary for effectuating the statutory scheme, we decline to prohibit application of generally applicable 
federal regulatory authority to tribes on the existence of such a treaty right alone.” 
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Judge White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, took a different view.  Judge 
White began by acknowledging that under Circuit precedent, the tribe’s inherent sovereignty 
could not prevent the application of general federal law. However, the tribe’s treaty right was 
another matter.”160  Disagreeing with the majority that the treaty right to exclude was not specific 
enough, Judge White stated 
As memorialized in the Treaty, in exchange for “relinquishing ... several townships” to 
the federal government, the Tribe secured the “exclusive use, ownership, and occupancy” 
of the remnant it retained. ..Surely, these signatories who just gave up a significant 
portion of their homeland, would not have understood their right to the “exclusive use, 
ownership, and occupancy” of their remaining land to be limited, non-specific, or subject 
to regulation regarding the conditions the Tribe might impose on those it permitted to 
enter. On the contrary, the Tribe would reasonably have understood this provision to 
mean that the federal government could not dictate, in any way, what the Tribe did on the 
land it retained.161  
Judge White concluded that “Absent Congress's express direction to the contrary, the Tribe's 
treaty-based exclusionary right is sufficient to preclude application of the NLRA to the Tribe's 
on- reservation Casino.”162  
CONCLUSION:  
A treaty right to exclude is more valuable to the tribes because in order for this right to be 
abrogated a party has to show clear evidence of congressional intent to that effect. The Supreme 
Court has, however, found such clear evidence when Congress has allowed Indian land to be 
transferred to non-members.   In addition, most courts have generally required treaty rights to 
have a certain level of specificity before acknowledging that they may give more rights than 
what tribes already have under their inherent sovereign powers.  Finally, it is important to note 
that while tribes have been successful at the Supreme Court when it comes to defending their 
treaty rights, just about all of the Indian treaty cases have involved off reservation hunting, 
fishing, or gathering rights.163  Although one of the later cases involved a treaty right to avoid 
state fuel taxes on trucks using state highways to reach the reservation,164 that case also involved 
 
160 As she put it, “It well may be that when a tribe's inherent sovereignty rights are broadly interpreted, its 
treaty-based exclusionary right (general or specific) has little work to do. But out of necessity, the treaty-
based right assumes a paramount role when a tribe's inherent sovereignty has been judicially narrowed, 
and the treaty should not be narrowly interpreted.” Id., at 677. 
161 Id., at 676. 
162 Id., at 676-677.  
163 See Washington v. Washington State Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 433 U.S. 658 (1979), Minnesota 
v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewas, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019).      
164 Cougar Den v. Washington State Dept. of Licensing, 193 S. Ct. 1000 (2019). 
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off reservation activities.  Moreover, none of the cases involved using a treaty right to control the 
activities or non-tribal members as would be the case when invoking the treaty right to exclude. 
Finally, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks is not a model of clarity and lends itself to 
different interpretations.  This Article has argued that while each of the three interpretations can 
find support in the language used in Hicks, the more doctrinally sounder interpretation among the 
circuits, is the one adopted by the Ninth Circuit.  Under that version, before the Montana 
analysis can be applied to potentially divest Indian tribes of jurisdiction over Indian owned 
reservation lands, the parties arguing against tribal jurisdiction have to show a state interest 
important enough to neutralize the tribal right to exclude.  This article has also argued, however,  
that an even better way to proceed would be to re-imagine or re-conceptualize Hicks as a state 
jurisdiction case.    
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